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The tastes and distastes of verbivores – some observations on 




“Creative language is not a capacity 
of special people but a special 
capacity of all people. It shows 
speakers as language makers and 






X-phemisation constitutes a powerful appraisal resource which weaves the 
ethnopragmatic texture of a culture. X-phemisms constitute a special type of non-literal 
language which capitalizes on all other possible types of non-literal language and the 
creative exploitation of phonetic-based word play. The main aim in the present paper is 
to elaborate on a hypothesis of X-phemisation via lexical extension (recruitment) as 
involving the mechanism of nominal metaphor at the conceptual level. This mechanism 
involves reframing of the vehicle (target) denotatum with an accompanying 
rearrangement in salience rating in the arising ad hoc concept resulting from blending 
the frames of the topic and vehicle denotata. This stereotype-violating mechanism 
reveals the power of human ingenuity at the deepest level of linguistic creativity. The ad 
hoc X-phemistic concept blends in an axiologically motivated manner the contextually 
relevant features of both denotata in a salience-constrained perceptually and 
evaluatively ordered set of features, triggered by the initial anchoring via the topic 
denotatum evoked by the actual lexical expression (the vehicle lexical concept). 
X-phemisms (from fully lexicalized ones to highly innovative/artful ones) and 
X-phemisation as an epiphenomenal occurrence in online linguistic interaction are seen 
as constituting a special subsystem in the appraisal resources of a language. This 
subsystem has special status with its high creativity and figurativity. Figurativity 
captures simultaneously the emergent, dynamic nature of X-phemisms and their 
grounding in stable conceptual metaphoric structures (in terms of strategies for their 
production/comprehension). Despite the diversity of X-phemism types (both in terms of 
their overall pragmatic effect) and the nature of their origin (resulting from substitution, 
lexical creativity, metaphoric transfers, phonetic innovation, word play, etc.), 
X-phemisms constitute a complex uniform catgory whose complexity can only be 
adequately studied in the framework of interactional cognitive studies, where the 
emotional brain is also subsumed under ‘cognitive’.  
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1. Introduction 
 
X-phemisms constitute a category of non-literal forms in their own right. Some of 
them piggyback on other categories of nonliteral forms (such as metaphors, 
metonymies, irony, idioms, hyperbobles, litotes, etc.), others exploiting different 
meaning-creating strategies (alliterations, sound dis/associations, etc.) may even be 
perceived as literal language. Despite the cognitive complexities involved in 
differentiating between literal and non-literal, X-phemisms of all types are characterized 
by projecting the speaker as having taken a specific evaluative stance2. X-phemisms 
always involve attitudinal marking and in their cognitive and pragmatic effects they 
constitute a uniform category despite the ingenuity in their creation and the diverse 
types they realize (for an overview of the types of X-phemisms see Allan and Burridge 
1988, 1992, 2006, Crespo Fernández 2008; Gomez 2009 among others). X-phemisms 
are unified by a constant among all their rich pragmatic accomplishments – an implicit, 
cancelable, yet clearly detectable attitudinal stance (irrespective of the intentions of the 
speaker and the degree of self-awareness projected in the production of an X-phemism). 
Even if the speaker has engaged in X-phemistic verbal behavior inadvertently, the X-
phemism functions as an anchor for inferential and interpretative strategies and affects 
the perception of both the denonantum and the speaker.  
Reliable generalizability is difficult with X-phemisms as they embody the platitude, to 
borrow Barr and Keysar’ words [2005: 22] that “meaning is underdetermined in the 
sense that the same string of words can convey anything from a benign comment to 
vicious sarcasm”. It is rather challenging to come up with a uniform fruitful heuristic for 
the study of tinted language. Tinted language can only be studied in view of the 
numerous socio-cultural variables which anchor its value along the benign-vicious scale. 
However, as no exhaustive list of socio-cultural variables that might directly correlate 
with X-phemisms has been compiled and since the interplay between types of non-
literal language and determining socio-cultural variables is extremely involved and 
varied, in this paper the use of X-phemisation is discussed as broadly couched in a 
multifaceted context which is viewed as a more or less coherent whole, without 
expressly defining each relevant variable which might have causal effects on any 
features of the X-phemism. Only when a specific variable is considered of extraordinary 
importance and is identified as clearly acting as a causal agent for a particular feature of 
an X-phemism will it be singly named and discussed as and if appropriate. Consequently, 
unless expressly stated otherwise, throughout the current paper interactants who are 
able to recognize an X-phemism as such are assumed to be prototypically generally 
affected in terms of their emotional response; their attitude toward the speaker, another 
person, the target referent or some issue. At least in the majority of cases of X-phemistic 
verbal use, the speaker is perceived as having projected a certain attitude and is 
perceived as having taken a particular appraisal stance. Recruitment X-phemisms form a 
                                                
2 Stance is used here as defined by Du Bois “a public act by a social actor, achieved through overt means, of 
evaluation, positioning, and alignment, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural 
landscape” [Dubois 2002]. This definition is harmonious with Martin’s [Martin 2001] understanding of 
the interplay between evaluation and appraisal and the taking of stance in relation to these.  
 




special part of the appraisal resources of a language. With recruitment X-phemisms the 
representational dimension of meaning is superceded by the stance-taking appraisal 
one as the point of entry into a concept, i.e. the mode of signification, is changed. This 
relates to the distribution of effort between rhetoric and desing3 in achieving the overall 
communicative effect in interaction. Thus recruitment X-phemisms surface with default 
engagement value which is difficult to cancel. 
 As any phenomenon involving syntax or semantics and concerning pragmatics are 
made insurmountably artificial if not studied in situ, the present paper dicusses either 
fully lexicalized X-phemisms (whose contextual uniqueness has been reduced to more 
or less predictable variability) or absolutely novel ones with the general public as 
intended listener, in order for heightened authenticity to be achieved (relying 
predominantly on observational methodologies). 
 Among the plethora of X-phemistic types (classified in terms of the creative process 
involved in their coming into being – e.g. figures, flippancies, remodellings, metaphors, 
substitutions, sound symbolism/phonesthesia, etc.), the X-phemisms defined by Allan 
and Burridge 1991 as “cross-varietal synonyms” are the focus of the present discussion. 
Instead of being recognized as synonyms, X-phemisms of this type are interpreted as 
“recruitment” X-phemisms. The choice is not simply a matter of terminological 
preference. The term “recruitment” more precisely presents the fact that X-phemisms 
are not simply cross-varietal synonyms as they always involve the dimension of affect 
and thus constitute neo-semanticisms with specific socio-cognitive features, not simply 
contextual synonyms with differential stylistic effect – they encode the affect dimension 
and it becomes part of their multidimensional semantic constitution. Besides 
“recruitment X-phemisms” (to be explained in part 3), idiomatic X-phemisms, X-
phemistic verbs for orthophemistic activities, and X-phemistic diminuitives are 
discussed (in parts 4, and 5 and 6 respectively). 
 The data have been excerpted from three corpus-based dicitionaries (two editions of 
the series New words in Bulgarian 2001 and 2010 and a Bulgarian-English dictionary of 
slang 2010), from the newspapers “Trud”, “24 chasa” and “Dnevnik” in Bulgaria, from 
OED and Holder’s dictionary of euphemisms (2007). As a consequence, the majority of X-
phemisms discussed are fully lexicalized or semi-lexicalised. A notable exception is the 
creative, contextual euphemistic dysphemism discussed in 3.2.  
 The methodology applied is observational (not experimental), and hypothetico-
deductive. The analysis makes use of the achievements of Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
(CMT - Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999), Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT - Fauconnier 
and Turner 2002), Theory of Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models (LCCM theory - 
Evans 2007, 2009), psycholinguistic studies of non-literal language and human 
categorization (Colston and Katz 2005; McGlone et al. 1994; Glucksberg 2001), socio-
                                                
3 Kress [2010: 49] distinguishes between representation and communication as two distinct social 
practices. Both are involved in linguistic interaction. Rhetoric is oriented toward the social or political 
dimensions of communication, while design is oriented to the semiotic, i.e. representational dimension of 
interaction. In choosing a specific lexical item a speaker commits his/herself to an “aptness” 
consideration, how fit a given signifier is to be the expression of a particular meaning. A lexical item is a 
perceptual prompt offered by the speaker for the way a referent is to be approached. It functions as a 
blue-print for (re)arranging the properties of the referent in terms of salience. Thus the invitation for 
rearrangement functions as indicator of stance-taking.  
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cognitive studies of stereotypes (Schneider 2004; Hamilton et al. 1994) and the findings 
of X-phemisms specialists (Allan and Burridge 2006, Crespo Fernández 2008, Gomez 
2009).  
 A terminological and methodological digression is in order. Following Richards 
(1936) and Glucksberg (2001) in understanding nominal metaphors, in the present 
paper the following terms will be utilized: “topic” as the referent of the X-phemism and 
“vehicle” as the predicate noun, which provides the “ground” (of the metaphor, if such is 
involved in the origin of the X-phemism) or the anchor for the ad hoc conceptualization. 
The ground is the new information provided by the vehicle, that is, the property or 
properties of the vehicle that are assumed or at least projected as characterizing the 
(metaphor) topic. Throughout the paper target and topic will be used interchangeably, 
as will be vehicle and source. This seeming inconsistency is necessitated by the fact that 
the latter terms are better suited to X-phemisms which result from conceptual 
metaphors and which have been lexicalized (conventionalized) to a higher degree, while 
the former more adequately describe the process in creating novel X-phemisms. 
Nominal metaphor is assumed to instantiate the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
recruitment X-phemisation. No matter if nominal metaphor is actually used in the 
linguistic encoding in the communicative exchange, the mechanism of category (and 
attribute) reframing driving nominal metaphor underlies and governs the conceptual 
processes implicated in X-phemisation (at least as far as recruitment and figurative 
(idiomatic) X-phemisms are concerned). In the theory of nominal (referential) 
metaphor, topic is considered to be the “given” information (Clark and Haviland 1977). 
In acknowledging the operationality of nominal metaphor as the conceptual mechanism 
underlying X-phemisation, it should expressely be noted that the vehicle (source) 
denotatum presented directly with its lexical concept profiles the conceptualization and 
provides the trigger for reframing the attributes set of the topic (target) denotatum. X-
phemisms are exemplar cases of what Evans [2010: 604] defines as linguistic metaphor 
- “an utterance-specific metaphoric conception”. For him, linguistic metaphors, which 
are elements of front-stage processing realizing presentational design and differ from 
conceptual metaphors as elements of back-stage cognition, reside in and emerge “from a 
situated (and hence contextualised) instance of language use. Linguistic metaphors may 
draw upon non-linguistic knowledge (including conceptual metaphors)” [ibid.]. The 
specifics of X-phemisation establishes it as a complex process employing the mechanism 
of metaphtonymy4 which collapses the joint effects of the two conceptual operations of 
metaphor and metonymy without predicating any sequential or causal ordering 
between the two and manages to capture their intricate interplay. By their mere coming 
into being X-phemisms represent “illocutionary metonymies” as defined by Panther and 
Thornburg (2003, 2007) and invite the perforce creation of a single referentially 
contiguous domain matrix as frame against which the target denotatum (referent) is to 
be perceived and conceptualized in an ad hoc conceptual structure.  
  
 
                                                
4 Metaphtonymy is used as a cover term to name processes of conceptual (and/or referential) metaphors 
and metonymies. It was coined by Goossens and defined as “a mere cover term which should help to 
increase our awareness of the fact that metaphor and metony can be intertwined” [Goossens 2003: 350]. 




2. X-phemisms as an appraisal resource 
 
This seeming complication only comes to illustrate that the study of X-phemisms as 
linguistic items and of X-phemisation as a complex phenomenon involving linguistic, 
socio-cognitive, discursive and social psychological dimensions is extremely challenging. 
As Ricoeur [1981: 340] has warned us “language could extend itself to its very limits 
forever discovering new resonances within itself” and X-phemisation plays an important 
role in amplifying these resonances which are intricately interwoven with various 
linguistic processes, such as semantic and lexical changes for example, metaphtonomy 
extension through creating novel modifications of conceptual metaphors and/or 
metonymys, etc. This rich system of “resonances” belongs to the appraisal resources of a 
language, even though it cannot be straightjacketed into any of the well-differentiated 
systems thereof. Appraisal language of affect relates to the expression of the speaker’s 
opinion along the good/bad parameter. The wide range of interpersonal resources 
known by the blanket term “appraisal” resources interact intricately with X-phemisation 
as they specialize in the expression of affect and emotion, which are often difficult to 
differentiate among. The semantics of evalutaion involves according to Martin [2000: 
144] a specification of “how the interlocutors are feeling, the judgements they make, and 
the value they place on the various phenomena in their experience”. In X-phemisation 
interactants’ affect and judgement attitudes are implicitly encoded and this makes X-
phemisation a central resource of the appraisal system. X-phemisation is closely linked 
with the “potential of language to express different emotions and degrees of emotional 
intensity” [Ochs 1989: 1]. In systemic functional accounts X-phemisms (subsumed 
under technical and specialized lexis, taboo lexis and swearing, slang and naming 
(Halliday 1994, Martin 2000) are classified under the system of involvment and are 
considererd non-gradable. However X-phemisation is a gradable phenomeonon as 
various X-phemisms can have different values in different communicative exchanges 
and more importantly X-phemisms for the same denotatum can be graded along the 
attitudinal/judgmental connotations encoded in them (e.g. spineless, weak-kneed, which 
illustrate the concept of recruitment dysphemisms, express different degrees of 
disapproval judgements in relation to the orthophemistic indecisive, irresolute).  
 This non-referentially evaluative semantics has led to the establishment of X-
phemisation in all cultures as a powerful ecological niche within the appraisal resources 
of a language. The appraisal system avails of both explicit (descriptive) evaluative 
expressions and masked (implicit) ones. More significantly, appraisal collapses pure 
emotion and cognitive evaluation or as Malrieu [1999: 50] has formulated it, 
“[e]valuation is precisely one of the ways in which culture gives a shape to our affects 
and it should therefore be perceived as a point of articulation between affects and 
cognition”. X-phemisms with their amalgamation of cognition (conceptualization and 
reconceptualization) and direct tapping into emotional sensitivities provides the 
verbiage articulating evaluation via their colouring rhetoric and ample design5. 
                                                
5 Rhetoric and design here refer to Gunther Kress’ social semiotic approach to contemporary 
communication [Kress 2010: 26], according to which “the world of meaning … is marked by instability 
and provisionality, every event of communication is unpredictable in its form, structure and its 
‘unfolding’”. “The rhetor as maker of a message  now makes an assessment of all aspects of the 
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“Rhetoric” in relation to X-phemisation identifies the fine nuances of (implicit) 
evaluation, while “design” relates to the specific presentational mode chosen in the 
realization of X-phemisms. The presentational mode chosen for an X-phemism has 
direct influence on the interpretation of the denotatum and has the power to override 
the essence of the denotatum and impinge on its different properties. The dysphemism 
for “sinning” backsliding does not only offer an alternative name, presenting “sinning” 
(which is referentialy judgmental) as “physical movement backwards” only indirectly 
expresses judgement by capitalizing on the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY and 
the implicational complex of lower level metaphors associated with it. In comparison to 
“sinning”, “backsliding” with its figurative presentational mode invites the listener to 
reassess sinning and its consequences in more physical terms and this perceptually 
aggrevates the negative judgement passed on this human activity. It also stripps the 
activity from its religious implications and broadens the category. Thus X-phemisms 
challenge standardized referentially judgmental values and overcome the highly 
schemtazied, conventionalized viewing of the world through languge. This viewing is 
what Slobin [2005: 13] has termed the “more static way of language use” of adults, 
which arises out of getting accustomed “to the schematics of language” [ibid.] and 
accounts for the existence of stereotypical frames associated with specific referents. The 
more interactive framing of referents characteristic of X-phemisms revives the more 
interactive, inventive and playful exploitation of the “rules of the game”. X-phemisms are 
thus tied up with the “heuristic” or “I explore” function which Halliday (1975) identified 
for language. This heuristic function interacts with the imaginative one, to produce the 
highly effective impact of reconceptualization as an appraisal resource. X-phemisation 
plays a pivotal role in value shifts on the basis of the joint attention thesis (Tomasello 
2003a; 2003b). Recruitment X-phemisms offer alternative frames and thus window the 
attention of interactants to previously unnoticed or considered insignificant features of 
the topic referent, or introduce new ones. When they become fully lexicalized, such X-
phemisms lose much of their attentional appeal and shed much of their interactive and 
conceptual creativity; instead they (or rather their use) acquire a predominantly 
indexing function positioning interactants in particular sociolinguistic categories. 
Lexicalization is tightly linked with stored mutual knowledge on the part of interactants 
and the degree of novelty will depend on the socio-cultural and experiental backgrounds 
of the interactants in a given communicative exchange. The degree of novelty plays a 
role in identifying the directedness of dysphemisms towards the referent or towards the 
interactant. There is a tendency for novel dysphemisms are perceived as offensive 
towards the referent, while fully lexicalized and widely known dysphemisms are more 
likely to exercise an offensive effect towards the interactant as they have acquired a 
degree of stereotypicality which guarantees the predominance of their indexing 
function. From a purely psychological point of view, if a speaker chooses to present a 
referent in discourse through a fully lexicalized dysphemism (such as пълно дърво 
[palno darvo, “absolute tree”, somebody/something dull, useless orincompetent]) this is 
easily interpreted as expressing a negative or at least slithing attitude to the 
                                                                                                                                                    
communicational situation” [ibid.] and resorts to designing the presentation of meaning intentions and 
knowledge by exploiting all available semiotic resources, where menaing and forms mutually permeate 
one another.    




interactant(s) as both parties engaged in the communicative exchange are aware of the 
judgmental value of a fully lexicalized dysphemism. Engaging the listener in such a mode 
of discourse implies that the listener is not considered as projecting an authority to be 
reckoned with, so both social and linguistic interdiction are loosened. In parallel to using 
a honorific marker (if there is such a system in a language), the choice of a lexicalized 
dysphemism might be recognized as one of these indexes which Silverstein6 (1976) 
called “maximally creative”. Besides signaling solidarity, the use of a lexicalized 
dysphemism indicates lowering of the discourses which implicates the listener as 
belonging to that realm of the order of discourses. If a dysphemism is novel, there is 
always the possibility for its representational and connotative functions to suppress its 
indexing function (to both referent and interactant) for lack of associations with other 
contexts. The novelty of a dysphemism (for lack of other implicated contexts and 
polyphonous voices) guarantees its indexing ‘innocence’ in relation to the referent7. 
When I heard for the first time a student in class describe the tape-recorder as тояга 
[toyaga, cudgel, bludgeon], I didn’t interpret his verbal behavior as intentionally negative 
towards me. I had never heard this expression and strained my mind to uncover the 
intended meaning. When I learned that it means the same as the lexicalized пълно 
дърво I interpreted this use as indicating the poor state of the tape recorder and the low 
quality it produced in class and the student’s infuriation with these facts. When later I 
heard a colleague of mine use this as a description of a novel I felt a bit dejected as I 
perceived this verbal choice as indexing me as incapable of following a more elaborate 
and argumented opinion of a book.  
The specific appraisal effect of X-phemisms is the projection of a particular speaker’s 
persona who takes a distinct evaluative stance (no matter if the reasoning mind has 
purposefully chosen the respective expression). This attitudinal positioning is achieved 
at the lexical level but the lexical expressions used have masked attitudinal values, i.e. 
they have only connotative evaluative values and are not referentially evaluative (they 
are recruited for the evaluative lexicon on the basis of the X-phemistic effects they 
produce on the basis of the denotative reframing they engender). For the greater part X-
phemistic expressions encode adopted appraisal stances, in which it is difficult to 
distinguish between the separate evaluative dimensions – judgment, affect and 
appreciation. Leading among these stances is the affectual one because this is what the 
listener experiences in perceiving the X-phemism.  
  X-phemisms are not simply cross-varietal synonyms as each X-phemistic expression 
produces unique cognitive effects. Resulting from communicatively represented social 
esteem or social sanction X-phemisms, fill in an ecological niche in the evaluative 
resources of language as X-phemisation naturalises a specific listener’s position as far as 
evaluation is concerned as it is recognized by Martin (2000: 142-143) as fairly directive 
                                                
6 In Silverstein’s indexiality approach to culture “the communicative force of culture works not only in 
representing aspects of reality, but also in connecting individuals, groups, situations, objects with other 
individuals, groups, situations, and objects or, more generally, with other contexts” [Duranti 1997: 35].  
7 According to Agha (n.d.) speech is personified in the sense that variations in lexical repertoire are linked 
to social classifications of interactants. “Once speech is personified in this way the deployment of 
particular slang repertoires makes possible both the performance of normative identities and the tropic 
manipulation of speaker persona through various types of displaced usages” [Agha n.d.: 5]. In this way the 
emergent speaker-addressee alignment projected by a speaker indexes the listener as well.  
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in the kinds of attitude it wants the listener’s to share. The concepts of evaluation (as a 
central interpersonal resource in language), of connotation and X-phemisation are 
intricately interrelated and sharp boundaries are hard to draw. Appraisal is understood 
here as defined by Martin [2000: 145] as “the semantic resources used to negotiate 
emotions, judgements, and valuations, alongside resources for amplifying and engaging 
with these evaluations”. X-phemisms are special among appraisal resources as they are 
not referentially evaluative (unlike referentially evaluative adjectives – good, nasty, etc.) 
and combine cognitive and affective aspects. Admittedly, one is tempted to agree with 
Voloshinov [1973: 105] that, “[n]o utterance can be put together without value 
judgement. Every utterance is above all an evaluative orientation. Therefore, each 
element in a living utterance not only has a meaning but also has a value” (emphasis in 
the original). However lexical items have different modes of signification, i.e. provide 
different routes of access to conceptual content. In some evaluation is direct and is a 
default feature of the conceptual content and part of the representational function of the 
lexical item (good, pleasant, captivating, etc.), i.e. evaluation is part of their descriptive 
dimension. In others evaluation is secondary or derived via some associative 
mechanism, but their mode of signification triggers first and foremost a seemingly 
untinted description (e.g. fat, made). In the latter’s lexical concept center-stage is 
preserved for describing features of objective properties (fat – body size; made – origin). 
Euphemisms are by definition evaluative, but this is secondary, relational evaluation, 
arising out of the choice of the particular lexical item which in its primary mode of 
signification doesn’t have the cognitive motivation to evaluate. The fact that this lexical 
concept has been chosen in particular creates the marked evaluation by way of contrast 
with a neutral or negative lexical item. The euphemisms fully-figured and hand-crafted 
acquire their positive evaluative charge indirectly by exploiting the effect of elevation of 
indirect speech. As Malrieu [1999: 51] articulates the intertwining of cognition and 
affect, “evaluation either refers to a cognitive appraisal of a phenomenon or to the 
cognitive theory of processes of evaluation involving both cognitive and affective 
aspects.” Referential as opposed to affective evaluation is distinguished for its primary 
cognitive appraisal. Among the affective aspects a central place is occupied by 
perceptual behaviours as affect is the perceptually motivated representation in the 
emotional brain. X-phemistic linguistic behavior targets or achieves control over the 
perceptual behavior of interlocutors. This underlies the distinction which can be drawn 
between overtly evaluative language (perfect, gorgeous, disgusting, etc.) and covertly 
evaluative language (chicken-livered, duck-brained, gutless, etc.). Denotatively (explicitly) 
evaluative language (language whose primary function is to describe evaluative 
judgements) and connotatively evaluative language (where evaluation stems from the 
artful interplay between rhetoric and design and is heavily dependent on the 
(re)presentational mode of accessing the referent) rely on different cognitive processes 
for achieving attitudinal response in interactants. As Martin and White [2005: 64] 
reveal, “ideational meaning can be used not just to invite but to provoke an attitudinal 
response” which is rightfully considered “one function of lexical metaphor” [ibid.]. In 
fully lexicalized X-phemisms the two types of evaluation are amalgamated into one. Yet, 
despite acquiring denotatively evaluative properties, such expressions keep 
piggybacking on the literal meaning of the lexical item chosen for presentation and thus 
evaluation is masked behind socially censored linguistic choices.  




The recognition of the important role played by the presentational mode is 
harmonious with the acknowledgment of the significance of perceptually motivated 
affect. As Smith and Semin [2007: 134] remind us, 
 
[R]esearchers should acknowledge that adaptive cognition involves perceptual–
motor loops that pass through the environment rather than being mostly 
implemented by autonomous inner processes. Strong support for this principle 
comes from recent work placing sensory and motor information at the heart of both 
conceptual representations in general and particular social-cognitive processes like 
understanding other people. (Emphasis added)  
 
The understanding that socio-cognitive processes hinge on perceptual in situ triggers of 
meaning generation leads to the need to reassess our notions of concepts as stable 
structures and aknowledge the plasticity of categorization/conceptualization. This 
plasticity can fruitfully be operationalized in terms of ad hoc concept creation. X-
phemisation like metaphoric (or more generally figurative) language hinges on ad hoc 
concept creation (for a book-length treatment of the role of ad hoc concepts in non-
literal language creation/comprehension see Tendahl 2009). Creativity at this level boils 
down to the choice of recruiting stereotyped concepts to be refined in the construction 
of the ad hoc concept. Such an approach to conceptualization reveals the depth of 
creativity involved in X-phemistic linguistic behavior. 
 
 
3. Creativity and X-phemisation    
 
3.1. Creativity as reframing 
 
The issue of creativity in linguistic interaction has recently attracted enviable 
attention (Chomsky 1980, De Beaugrande 1985, Kearney 1998, Zawada 2006, Langlotz 
2006, Carter 2004, Munat 2007, 2010, etc.). As in all areas of investigating human 
ingenuity, the issue is wrought in controversies. Definitions of creativity range from 
rule-goverened recursion to idiosyncratic poetic creations and special ways with words. 
Hopefully the profusion of research on linguistic creativity will prove Chomsky [1980: 
222-223] wrong in his prophecy that “the creative use of language is a mystery that 
eludes our intellectual grasp.” For the purposes of the present argument, the 
comprehensive definition of linguistic creativity provided by Zawada [2006: 236-237] is 
adopted:  
 
(Linguistic) Creativity is an essential and pervasive, but multi-dimensional 
characteristic of all human beings (irrespective of age, education, intelligence, social 
status or artistic bent). Linguistic creativity is primarily the activity of making new 
meaning by a speaker (in the broadest sense of the user of language in all forms and 
in all mediums), and the recreation and re-interpretation of meaning(s) by a receiver. 
Linguistic creativity is secondarily observable as a feature or product in a language. 
Linguistic creativity is a graded phenomenon ranging from the more conventional 
and predictable to the less conventional and unpredictable, and it is manifested in all 
domains of language (lexis, grammar, text and discourse), the results of which may 
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or may not become conventionalised and therefore entrenched in a particular 
language. (Emphasis added) 
 
In view of this definition, recruitment X-phemisms are doubly creative because besides 
surfacing as new semanticisms (making new meanings), they orchestrate the attitudinal 
dimension in the semantic prosodies of linguistic expressions in the interpretative 
strategies of the interactants. As such X-phemisms become prototypical examples of 
lexicogenetic mechanisms8 of semantic change. As such they are characterized by 
creativity, which is understood as a “bisociative process” or the deliberate connecting of 
two previously unrelated “matrices of thought”. The two unrelated matrices of thought 
originate from the stereotypically construed nature of the denotatum and how it is 
framed in a particular communicative exchange. According to Koestler [1964: 119] 
creativity includes “the displacement of attention to something not previously noted, 
which was irrelevant in the old and is relevant in the new context; the discovery of 
hidden analogies as a result.” Thus the process of X-phemisation appears highly creative 
at the level of conceptualization or framing of denotata9. X-phemisation achieves an 
attention switch which is realized against the background of linguistic stereotyping. Just 
as stereotypes are, according to Blumentritt and Heredia [2005: 261-262] “cognitive 
frameworks that consist of beliefs and generalizations about perceived typical 
characteristics for certain social groups”, so lexicalizations10 in relation to any kind of 
denotata are stereotyping frames which activate particular cognitive schemas with 
certain properties of the denotatum and an underlying emotive-evaluative associative 
mark. X-phemistic expressions re-frame denotata and establish alternative frames by 
imposing a different anchoring in the ad hoc conceptualization process involved in 
online linguistic interaction. X-phemisms function as cues to semantic priming with 
heightened emotive-evaluative results. This priming is based on contingent 
metapthonymic relations. Conceptual metaphors themselves are not X-phemistically 
specified, even though certain source domains used as maps to the nature/topology of 
more conceptually demanding domains might show some proclivity towards 
predominantly dysphemistic or predominantly euphemistic prompting. On the whole, as 
Crespo Fernández [2008: 97] revealingly argues:   
 
certain values are given priority in the metaphorical structuring of a given concept, 
the filter of metaphorical conceptualization through which reality is presented 
provides us with a partial understanding of the concept, masking or revealing 
particular aspects of the topic being dealt with, a process which makes conceptual 
                                                
8 “Onomasiological (or ‘lexicogenetic’) mechanisms, conversely, involve changes through which a concept, 
regardless of whether or not it has previously been lexicalized, comes to be expressed by a new or 
alternative lexical item.” [Geeraerts 2010: 26] 
9 This conception is fully in keeping with Gómez’s (2009) attenuation and reinforcement developments of 
alternative conceptualizations of interdicted areas in euphemisation. In addition to the reinforcement of 
forbidden areas in dysphemisms, in the present paper it is claimed that dysphemistic reconceptualization 
is possible in cases of conceptual orthophemy (i.e. attitudinally neutral areas). 
10 By lexicalization here is meant the packaging of conceptual content via a lexical concept into a 
conventionalized lexical expression (as opposed to encoding via grammatical means, discourse 
structuring or other more elaborate expressive strategies). 




metaphors readily accessible for euphemistic or dysphemistic reference 
respectively. 
 
To further stretch the applicability of conceptual metaphor in human life, we will use 
them here to make more palpable the cognitive processes underlying recruitment X-
phemisation. Such a move of exploiting conceptual metaphors as theoretical 
(metalinguistic) vehicles is justifiable in view of their being recognized by Evans [2010: 
603] as being “concerned with backstage cognition - the role of the non-linguistic 
conceptual processes that facilitate meaning construction behind the scenes”, and not as 
statements from a theory about understanding metaphor in language. The complex 
processes of X-phemisation instantiate the conceptual metaphor CREATIVITY IS SEEING IN 
DIFFERENT LIGHT. The basic scenario revealing the nature of reframing in X-phemisation 
can be captured in another well-established conceptual metaphor CREATING IS MAKING 
VISIBLE. The essence of reframing in X-phemisation is offering a perspective for viewing 
the referent from the perspective of its presupposed similarity with the referent named 
by the lexical concept used as a new semanticism. It also implicates the overriding 
metaphor IDEAS ARE PERCEPTIONS. And last but not least, the mechanism of nominal 
metaphor underlying recruitment X-phemisms is accomplished via THE COMPARISON OF 
PROPERTIES IS THE COMPARISON OF PHYSICAL PROPERTIES. When combined as principles of 
backstage cognition and as metalinguistic models these conceptual metaphors 
summarise the backstage cognitive processes driving X-phemisation. In X-phemistic 
linguistic behavior (as defined by Allan and Burridge 2006) the X-phemistic expressions 
as instructional prompts invite a different, non-stereotypical conceptualization of the 
denotatum. This conceptualization may or may not involve conceptual metaphor (X-
phemistic verbs only rarely involve and X-phemistic diminutives never involve 
conceptual metaphors). What makes X-phemisms special among the numerous 
linguistic realizations of conceptual metaphors is the fact that the former are not driven 
by the economy principle of borrowing the conceptual representations of concrete 
concepts for the representation of more abstract ones. In X-phemisation it is often the 
case that the target and the source share the same dgree of concreteness. The 
motivation behind the creative application of conceptual metaphor in the creation or 
use of X-phemisms is the realization of an attitudinal switch in keeping with the 
hypothesis of joint attentional behavior (Tomasello 2003a, 2003b) and the hypothesis 
that the mechanism of nominal metaphor underlies conceptual processes in X-
phemisation.  
Actually, the cognitive processes resulting in X-phemisation are consistent with 
Murphy’s (1996) weak version of the role of conceptual metaphor for representations in 
the mind and their linguistic encoding. X-phemisms provide pragmatically motivated 
reconceptualizations responsible for the semantic prosodical marking of a verbal 
exchange. In X-phemistic categorization the salience and centrality of features are 
rearranged, i.e. a different set of features is identified as central for categorization and 
promoted as sufficient for recognizing the referent as a member of the category we are 
assigning it to. We judge the referent against a situationally relevant prototype and the 
ad hoc concept we project of it accumulates features which are judgementally 
(attitudinally) motivated. As social categories are by definition value-laden (Schneider 
2004) and folk theories underlie categorization, it is obvious that in situ 
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conceptualization involves social recategorization as a feature X-phemistic categories, 
which modulate the values associated with a certain referent, reframing it in a way that 
will evoke certain category ascriptions that are situationally relevant and have specific 
axiological marking. X-phemisation involves the creation of compound categories which 
frame the referent in unexpected but revealing ways.  
This aspect of the conceptual creativity of X-phemisation is best operationalized as 
the emergent properties of the referent which is conceptualized ad hoc as a compound 
category. In its turn the notion of the compound ad hoc concept operationalizes Crespo 
Fernández’s insight about the bidirectionality of lexicalized conceptual metaphor within 
the framework of Black’s Interactive Theory of metaphor. In Crespo Fernández’s [2008: 
101] own words, 
 
it can be deduced that using metaphors with a lexicalized sexual meaning in 
discourse does not only involve a projection from the source domain onto the target 
domain, since the target domain may also be projected onto the source domain.  
 
The phenomenon of bidirectionality is not restricted to lexicalized sexual taboos but 
has a much wider scope, underlying numerous recruitment X-phemisms as part of the 
compounding conceptual mechanism actualized in reframing. There frequently arise 
contexts in which ambiguity is difficult to resolve between the metaphoric (target) 
reading of an X-phemism and the literal (source) meaning of actualized lexicalization. 
Pfaff, Gibbs and Johnson [1997: 61-62] provide evidence that the mitigating or offensive 
value of X-phemisms is easier to comprehend if there is a conceptual match between 
these and the context,   
 
Our contention is that a speaker should consider one X-phemism [euphemism or 
dysphemism] more appropriate than another in a certain context because he is 
conceptualizing that context metaphorically... contexts can provide people with 
metaphorical concepts that influence the appropriateness or ease of interpretation 
of the X-phemism by cueing them to its metaphorical meaning. 
 
Той е голям лапач [Toy e golyam lapach, He is a real gobbler] describes a person who 
loves eating heartily when used in non-political or criminal contexts. When лапач 
appeared as the name of a special police operation for financial criminals and occupied 
the front pages of printed media (e.g. the newspaper Dnevnik 23 March 2010) for a 
week or so, the lexical item acquired strongly dysphemistic properties, which have now 
overridden its original, literal meaning. It is now understood as He is one of the real 
spongers/moochers/criminals and if a speaker has intended it to apply with its literal 
meaning, they resort to repeating the lexical item to indicate that it has to be understood 
in its original meaning relating to food consumption. The dysphemism lexicalizes the 
GETTING IS EATING conceptual metaphor. When used in the media (to report for example 
the special police operation for arresting people involved in schemes for stealing VAT 
from the state), it is understood exclusively in its dysphemistic meaning. When used in 
everyday contexts in family settings, it remains ambiguous because the target 
dysphemistic meaning is so salient in terms of the socio-political situation that it has 
been projected onto the initial source and is likely to be ousted out in its original 




meaning to be replaced by the more generic noun associated with the consumption of 
food ядач [yadach, a person who eats a lot and loves to eat]. Such examples (and there a 
plenty of them) point to the fact that X-phemisation results from playing bottom-up 
against top-down processing in perception and everyday categorization. Top-down 
processing is granted pronounced dominance because the reframing is constrained and 
guided by contextual coherence and value investment sneaks its way into the ad hoc 
conceptualization. Sharing Zawada’s opinion [2006: 250] that “[t]he conceptual 
structures and processes that underlie linguistic creativity are the essence of linguistic 
creativity”, we resort to reviewing X-phemistic creativity as engaging the manipulation 
of stereotypical frames associated with primary lexicalizations.  
 
3.2. Reframing and stereotype modification in recruitment X-phemisms 
 
 As Halford and Wilson [2002: 153] contend, “[c]reativity may be defined as the 
production of effective novelty through the operation of our mental processes.” Effective 
novelty employs the modification of communally shared standrad beliefs and opinion, 
or stereotypes by designing or recruiting new presentational modes or establishing new 
lexical concepts11 for familiar lexical items (which is the linguistic mechanism for 
recruitment metaphors). The principle is operative in metaphor as a type of non-literal 
language as Crespo Fernández [2008: 102] emphasizes: 
 
This constitutes a basic tenet in the Interactive Theory developed by Black (1962 
and 1979), which sees metaphor as an intellectual operation with a cognitive import 
in which the creative response from the receiver allows for a redefinition of the 
frame, in Black’s terminology (or source domain in CMT), as a result of the system of 
associated commonplaces (i.e. standard beliefs and opinions shared by the 
members of a community) spontaneously evoked by the focus (or target domain). 
[Emphasis in bold added]. 
 
The creative response from the receiver involves a process of an ad hoc concept creation 
which taps into standardly held communal beliefs and opinions, i.e. comprehension 
violates stereotypical conceptualizations (“lexical concepts”) and alters valuations. The 
spontaneous evocation of such a response points out to the fact that the lexical item 
might be recruited purely by chance without resorting to back stage conceptual 
metaphors and result in the creation of a new lexical concept with marked X-phemistic 
properties. An established “lexical concept” provides a stereotypical framing of 
conceptual content, which X-phemisms take it upon themselves to shake off the 
established framing associated with the traditional lexical concept and trigger an 
alternative framing in which the conceptual content associated with a lexical concept is 
                                                
11 As Evans [2007], [2009] insists lexical concepts are “semantic units conventionally associated with 
linguistic forms” and are an essential part of a user’s mental grammar [Evans 2007: 11]. They are 
relativised with respect to conceptual knowledge structures (cognitive models).  Besides its “encoded 
content” each lexical concept evokes the execution of well-entrenched mental routines of accessing 
external knowledge structures with different degree of entrenchment, which constitutes the lexical 
concept’s unique profile. In situated use the lexical concept acquires contextually induced informational 
characterization. 
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rearranged so as to fit the contextual requirements for salient coherence of attribute 
assemblage associated with a new lexical concept matched to the familiar lexical item. 
The result of a lexical concept used as a recruitment X-phemisms is a new attitudinally 
specified semanticism. X-phemisation surfaces as one of the ways in which “lexical 
concepts interface with non-linguistic knowledge” [Evans 2010: 604]. These interface 
processes are achieved through lexical metaphors, which might be derived from 
conceptual metaphors but do not necessarily do so.   
A case in point is the most recent euphemistic dysphemism coined by the Bulgarian 
media дантели n., f., pl. [dantela n., f., sg., tracery, lace]. “Euphemistic dysphemisms and 
dysphemistic euphemisms have locutions which are at odds with their illocutionary 
point” [Allan and Burridge 2005: 15]. In the novel euphemistic dysphemism the lexical 
item and its stereotypical lexical context evoke pleasant associations about something 
beautiful and artful. The illocutionary force of the new lexical concept associated with 
the ad hoc concept has a strongly negative judgmental value. This new semanticism with 
euphemistic dysphemistic properties дантела can hardly be associated with a well 
established conceptual metaphor. The general frame associated with the lexical item’s 
nominal profiling is embroidery, the delicate, beautiful product of knitting, etc. The 
innocuous word acquired strong dysphemistic properties in describing a similarly 
innocent concept – speaking/verbally expressing a position taken on an issue. The word 
was used by a number of broadsheet and tabloid newspapers in relation to the positions 
taken by the Bulgarian Prime Minister in relation to the developments in Libya. The 
Prime Minister publicly announced in a matter of hours two highly opposing views, 
which was interpreted as a significant gaff on the part of Bulgaria’s Prime Minister. He 
explained his change of opinion with the “modes (fashions) of talking in Brussels”. First 
in a TV interview he labeled the military operation in Libya a “euphoric adventure 
triggered by oil money”, later the same day he defined the operation as “legitimate, 
necessary, and right”. Asked about the motives behind this dramatic change, he said that 
his “evaluation of political events is dependent on fashions of speaking in Bruslles”. The 
media were quick to accuse the Prime Minister of confusing politics with fashion 
catwalks and dubbed his behaviour “дантели”. Thus the lexical concept which names a 
beautiful piece of handiwork became a euphemistic dysphemism for speaking out of 
tune, without considering the consequences of one’s words. Now the word is used to 
name a person’s confused behavior (including verbal) based on the wrong assumptions. 
Lace production is a housewife’s pastime and irresponsible political behavior is framed 
as a pastime. The dysphemistic properties arise exclusively in the juxtapositioning of the 
frames of lace production and irresponsible public behavior with political 
consequences. This novel (novel both in terms of the temporal trajectory of semiosis12 
and in terms of conceptual creativity) euphemistic dysphemism quickly became very 
popular as the participants in the communicative act in which it was created were the 
                                                
12 “Meaning-making activity is a trajectory-in-time… It [meaning] cannot be reduced to the semiotic forms 
that are co-deployed in a given meaning-making activity or their physical-material substrate. Nor is it the 
object text that may result from this activity. Rather, the locus of meaning is the trajectory. It is useful to 
consider meaning-making activity as a semiogenetic trajectory that reaches back in time as well as 
forwards into the future. The relevant viewpoint here is that of the selves who jointly engage in such 
activities and the perspectives that they implicate” [Thibault 2004: 3- 4]. 
 




media and the general public. Its associative complex involves the veiling of one’s acts 
by words, where the veil is so thin that it cannot cover the gaff. It might have distant 
resonance with the implications of the conduit metaphor (Reddy [1979]), but direct 
mappings between the source domain of embroidery and the target domain of 
explaining one’s swinging opinions with verbal modes of one’s superiors are hard to 
draw and it is highly unlikely for the majority of people to engage in such convoluted 
comprehension strategies. It is more likely for дантели as the focus domain for the ad 
hoc conceptualization to evoke the salient meaning of something light and ephemeral of 
not exceptionally high significance.  
No matter what type of post hoc rationalization process a perceiver of an X-phemism 
might engage in, in order for a linguistic element to function as an X-phemism it has to 
have created a tinted emotional reaction or a switch in evaluative judgment in relation 
to a stereotypically differently valued referent. Through ad hoc dispersal of a 
stereotyped conceptualization of a referent X-phemisms construe attitudinal rating of 
social realities in interaction. In being invited to recognize a familiar referent in a new 
frame, a language user is invited to come up with establishing some kind of analogically 
motivated structural alignment between the referent and the novel frame it has been 
associated with. X-phemisation is an instance of category-inclusion assertions (Gibbs 
[1994]; McGlone [2001]). Novel and semi-lexicalized X-phemisms instantiate 
attributive-category extension in an analogous manner to the process of novel metaphor 
understanding in which according to Glucksberg (quoted after McGlone [2001: 99]) “we 
rely on our knowledge of the vehicle’s stereotypical properties and the attributional 
dimensions of the topic to construct attributive categories de novo.” In X-phemisation 
the stereotypical attributes of the source and target referents interact by mutually 
modifying one another and negotiating a novel salience-driven calibration of a coherent 
conceptualization. X-phemisms lexicalize or in some cases even trigger the 
establishment of new referential metonymies and metaphors through reframing the 
denotatum and thus propagating experience-triggered novel stereotyping contexts.  
Цедилник n., m., sg. [tsedilnik; “strainer, filter or tightener”] is used to mean “a very 
hard exam, a make-or-break test”. Hardly anything in the concept of straining directly 
maps onto the examination script. It is possible for a researcher after detailed analysis 
of the implicational complex associated with the focus frame (the lexical item 
performing the presentation) to arrive at primary and/or conceptual metaphors such as 
MENTAL CONTROL IS PHYSICAL CONTROL; DIFFICULT SUBJECTS ARE ADVERSARIES, etc. (with 
somewhat causal/motivating relation to the X-phemisms) but this is a hardly plausible 
scenario for how inetractants marshal the understanding of the X-phemism. The lexical 
item is used to evoke the stereotypical frame (or lexical concept) of a “strainer” and 
invite the listener to associate both attributively and emotionally a difficult exam and 
passing through a strainer in a plausible manner by establishing an ad hoc concept. The 
process of coherent attribute mixing is based both on conceptual metaphor and 
metonymy: first, the instrument (which is the meaning associated with the word-
formation pattern of the dysphemism) is used to subsume the whole event including the 
results of the activity of straining. At the same time there is metaphoric mapping 
between the activity of straining and an examination – the students are mapped onto 
the entity being strained and their experience of exertion, exhaustion and destruction is 
encoded through the inference chain associated with the state of being strained. The 
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ingenuity of the new semanticism lies in its ability to evoke a rich associative complex 
involving both metaphoric and metonymic reconceptualization strategies which are 
harnessed by the Graded Salience coherence of the ad hoc concept of being examined 
experienced as being processed by a strainer. 
  In other words, with X-phemisms as a special type of non-literal language “[t]he 
emphasis is thus neither on the characteristics of the target phrase per se nor, generally 
speaking, just on the discourse characteristics, but rather on the specific factors that 
appear in the presentational context and the meaning of those factors to the interpreter” 
[Katz 2005: 204]. The speaker invites the listener to tap beyond the set beliefs and find a 
contextually plausible interpretation that will reconcile the activated frames in a non-
contradictory manner. This leads to X-phemisms influencing the perceptual (point of 
entry) access to the referent with the result of modulated attitudinal associations being 
evoked. Katz [2005: 185] emphasizes the strength of representational design as “the 
interpretation of a given statement is inextricably linked to the manner in which it is 
presented, and when an explicit context is not available, one is constructed from stored 
knowledge during the act of comprehension.” The socio-cultural ecology of X-phemisms 
requires that knowledge-based context and on-going discourse-based context interact 
productively. This is achieved through a salience-driven process of stereotype 
disintegration and reassemblage of available stored knowledge about the target 
denotatum and the lexical concept of the source denotatum. The processes of conceptual 
disintegration (Bache [2005], Hougaard [2005]) and conceptual blending (Fauconnier 
and Turner [2002]) constitute a single cognitive mechanism. In Bache’s view [2005: 
1621] “conception can be said perhaps to facilitate perception by means of blending.” X-
phemisms may be, in our opinion, construed as reinforcing, to borrow Bache’s words, 
“certain types of mental compressions of perception” [ibid.]. X-phemisation collapses 
first- and third-order blending as defined by Bache. The blending is guided by “optimal 
innovation” and constrained by salience. The Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora [1997], 
[2003]; Huang [2009]) holds it that “meaning is accessed in a hierarchical manner in 
cognitive processing” [Huang 2009: 108]. The salient features are the stereotypical ones 
that have been entrenched in the conceptualization of a given category or at least in the 
lexical concept form the source domain. “[C]onsolidated and encoded lexical meanings 
of a mental entity are always activated in the initial process of comprehension, 
regardless of the context” [ibid.]. By creating an ad hoc concept interactants readily 
blend salient properties from both involved denotata. Stretching the Optimal Innovation 
Hypothesis (Giora 2002) beyond pleasurability and into X-phemisation in general, it is 
plausible to claim that optimal coherence arising from the interplay between salient 
features of the co-evoked referents and primed evaluative associations harness the 
creation of the ad hoc concept, as novelty that allows for the recover ability of the 
familiar. Optimal innovation operates by creating “novelty that allows for the 
recoverability of the familiar” [Giora 2002: 11]. Thus salient meanings from both evoked 
conceptualizations of referents are conjoined and reordered in an ad hoc coherence 
frame of graded appropriateness which supersedes the stereotypical frames of both 
denotata.  
 We hold stereotypes for almost anything around us, because we need to make quick 
decisions within everyday contexts for standard cognitive tasks. Stereotypes result from 
abilities to generalize. "The ability to generalize is a central, primitive, hard-wired 




cognitive activity" [Schneider 2004: 8]. Stereotypes are non-informed but stable 
judgmental values associated with a given concept/category. Schneider [2004: 8] 
illustrates that this is implied in the meaning of the term itself - “[t]he word ʻstereotype’ 
itself comes from the conjunction of two Greek words: stereos, meaning ʻsolid’ and typos, 
meaning ʻthe mark of a blow’ or more generally ʻa model’. Stereotypes thus ought to 
refer to solid models.” Stereotypes are packages of conceptual and 
attitudinal/evaluative frame-models we use in categorization. They are prototypes with 
replications of judgmental ratings in the emotional brain. Rigidity and duplication or 
sameness, which Miller [1982] identifies as central for stereotypes, project these 
conceptual-emotive models as stable structures used in conceptualization. The content 
of stereotypes is varied and it is difficult to spell out a general template for that, but they 
tend to capture the most salient features of a category and an overall evaluative rating 
for the category as a hole which is inherited in categorizing individual denonata as 
members of the respective category. In relying on stored concepts and categorizing as 
quickly as possible for the majority of everyday cognitive tasks, we heavily rely on such 
conceptual structures as in such contexts we usually categorize hastily and without 
much reflection. This is a survival cognitive strategy for achieving efficacy of decision-
making in everyday situations. Lippmann [1922: 88-89] fathoms that this is so because, 
 
[t]here is economy in this. For the attempt to see all things freshly and in detail, 
rather than as types and generalities, is exhausting, and among busy affairs 
practically out of the question.... Instead we notice a trait which marks a well known 
type, and fill in the rest of the picture by means of the stereotypes we carry about in 
our heads. 
   
X-phemisation intervenes in such processes by offering a new focus into the perception 
and conceptualization of the target denotatum and involves interactants in a process of 
disintegrating their stereotypical perceptions of denotata and triggering off a reframing 
by guided attention to context-relevant blended reordering in terms of salience. 
Stereotyping follows a general cognitive and socio-psychological pattern which is 
directly mirrored by processes of X-phemisation. Stereotypes are kinds of “universal 
judgments” and accompany the situated categorization of entities and their uncritical 
appraisal which instead of being contextually triggered, seem to be stable and almost 
automatic pieces of background knowledge. X-phemisation recalibrates stereotypes by 
modifying the hasty attitudinal and judgmental evaluative associations. 
As in different types of nonliteral forms it is possible for mixtures of mechanisms and 
processes, some of them contradictory and others complementary or parallel, to 
underlie the creation and interpretation of X-phemisms. The above claims hold water 
when the listener has recognized the X-phemism as such, no matter what the intentional 
motive of the speaker is. In case an X-phemism falls on deaf ears, its attitudinal validity 
is canceled and whatever comprehension it triggers the uniquely X-phemistic appraisal 
value is lost. The reframing may be still activated but the linguistic phenomenon will be 
another type of non-literal language, not an instance of X-phemisation. Recruitment X-
phemisms always evoke inflated perception and disturbance in a referential stereotype 
accompanied by attitudinal value fixation. The active involvement of the listener is 
crucial in the functioning of X-phemisms because X-phemisation is a paradigm case of 
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what Deborah Tannen [1986:106] identifies as ‘interactional frames’. She distinguishes 
between frames as knowledge structures and frames as active sites of negotiating 
meaning and what is actually going on. In her view knowledge structure schemas are 
“expectations based on prior experience about objects, events, and settings”, “a 
superordinate definition of what is being done by talk, what activity is being engaged in, 
HOW a speaker means what she says” [ibid.]. Under this refined classification of 
schemas and frames, X-phemisms appear as instances of an interactional frame in which 
a speaker instructs a listener to discard familiar frames associated with a referent and 
reconceptualize it by employing a different stereotype. “Interactive frames, but not 
knowledge structure schemas, are always a matter of two logical types: the concrete, 
particular way of speaking in the interaction, and the abstract set of associations that 
identifies the culturally significant interactive goal being served by that way of 
speaking” [ibid.]. 
Recruitment X-phemisms violate neutral, standard affordances of perceivables and 
overcome the stereotypical associative complexes that have been captured in a culture 
in conceptualizing a certain entity in a particular way and standardly relying on a 
particular lexical concept to provide easier access to it. They are metonymic in essence, 
because they realize the principle of highlighting a particular referent by activating a 
contextually salient or overtly presented entity closely associated with the referent in 
terms of conceptual contiguity (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff and Turner 1989). To 
pay justice to the facts of X-phemisation, we need to admit that both the principles of 
resemblance (by implicit comparison), i.e. the principle of metaphor and the principle of 
referential contiguity are both operative in recruitment X-phemisms. Goossens’ 
“metaphtonomy” aptly captures the impossibility to separate the engagement of both 
principles in X-phemisms. In analyzing the fully lexicalized dysphemism in Bulgarian 
озъбвам се на някого [ozybvam se na nyakogo, “bare one’s teeth at someone”, argue 
severely with someone, to oppose in a nasty manner] is a case in point which can illustrate 
the difficulty in tracing the ordered activation of metaphor and metonymy in 
interpreting complex instances of conceptual integration. The metaphor MENTAL 
ACTIVITIES ARE PHYSICAL ACTIVITIES provides the metaphoric frame, but the baring of teeth is 
also metonymic in relation to the literal lexical concept associated with the lexical item. 
This metonymic reading is induced by the BODILY REACTION FOR EMOTION metonymy, which 
is a special case of the more general EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy. The physical activity is 
typical of aggressive behaviours in dogs, which is interpreted as intimidating and 
indicating aggression. The impossibility of establishing an ordered sequence for the 
operation of the conceptual metaphors and metonymies in interpreting the reframing of 
“agitated arguing” as teeth-baring only comes to indicate that metonymy and metaphor 
are inextricably intertwined in X-phemisms as a special type of non-literal language. 
The construction of ad hoc X-phemistic concepts is driven by constraint satisfaction – 
the constraints relate to coherent blending of the bifurcated referentially anchored 
perception. The complex process of frame compounding is not as a simple as creating a 
master list of the features of both denotata, but involves an ordered sequence of 
disintegration and reintegration of salient features, driven by the the tacit 
acknowledgment that “[…] the general outlines of framing are understood not by 
atomistic structural representation of components of frames but by seeing the 
relationships among an array of particular dimensions of framing” [Tannen 1986: 107]. 




The invited reframing is first constrained by the proffered integration frame and second 
by the drive for coherent conceptualization into a Gestalt, which imposes the constraints 
of blending and coordination in a heightened and specifically windowed perception. 
Recruitment X-phemisms window the perceiver’s attention and provide the scaffolding 
against which the novel conceptualization is accomplished.   
Ad hoc conceptualization can only be executed after the referent of a piece of 
discourse has been established. This, as Barr and Keysar [2005: 28] remind us, depends 
heavily on a speaker’s lexical choices – “[t]he expression that a speaker chooses in 
referring to some object –from an elaborate, full noun phrase to a simple pronoun – will 
depend on the degree to which the referent is in the focus of attention in the discourse.” 
Besides this reliance on mutual knowledge for the disambiguation of reference, the 
choice of recruitment X-phemisms contains subtle instructions13 for the particular 
manner in which the interactant has to focus on/perceive the referent. The attitudinal 
value triggered by recruitment the X-phemism is of a specifiable kind – either positive or 
negative (both in terms of affect and in terms of judgment). Thus both fully lexicalized 
and novel X-phemisms trigger the listener’s fine-tuning of referent 
comprehension/perception as a different window of access is prescribed over and 
above the purely perceptual affordances in a communicative situation which invites 
situated cognition. 
Situated cognition suggests that humans use situated versions of concepts that have 
context-specific functions, and do not automatically activate the same, context-
independent conceptual frame in every situation (Yeh and Barsalou [2006]). Reframing 
will involve at least rearrangement in terms of salience in the complex configuration of 
the ingredients which constitute the conceptual frame of the non-stereotypical ad hoc 
concept formation.  
An example from the implicit attitudinal lexicon in Bulgarian used for the expression 
of approval is гадже убиец/трепач n., n., sg. [gadzhe trepach, “a killer/beater girlfriend”], 
which functions as a dysphemistic euphemism with the meaning of “an extremely 
attractive young girl”. From the instructional perspective of language on hearing a girl 
described as a killer the listener’s mind-set is invited to focus its attention on particular 
fetuares marked as salient by the speaker in choosing this particular lexical concept. A 
plausible, but highly unlikely, interpretative hypothesis might be to conceive of the girl-
friend as being a serial killer (in analogy with the “serial/black widow” stereotype) 
which would hinge on the literal salient meaning of the lexcical concept stereotypically 
associated with the lexical item убиец. However, the dysphemistic euphemism is 
unfailingly understood as expressing a highly positive attitudinal stance on the part of 
an aloof speaker projected as a victim to the power of attractivenss of the situational 
referent. This interpretation reveals its conceptual relatedness to a whole series of 
conceptual metaphors PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCES ARE PHYSICAL FORCES; EMOTIONS ARE FORCES; 
DESIRES ARE FORCES BETWEEN THE DESIRED AND THE DESIRER, SEXUALITY IS AN OFFENSIVE WEAPON, 
which as ingrained knowledge structures facilitate the contextually coherent 
construction of the ad hoc concept of a beauty being perceived in a particular way. 
                                                
13 “Instructions” is meant here as shorthand for Harder’s model of meaning as input or the instructioinal 
perspective on linguistic interaction, according to which “words are designed to prod, or prompt, the 
addressee to carry out interpretative activities of a specifiable kind” [Harder 2009: 15; emphasis added]. 
176                                                         Lexis 7: “Euphemism as a Word-Formation Process” 
 
© Lexis 2012 
 
 
4. Metaphtonymy in idiomatic X-phemisms 
 
 As back stage stable knowledge structures conceptual metaphors and metonymies 
aide and sometimes even provoke the functioning of X-phemisms as associative primes. 
They might underlie both monolexemic and idiomatic X-phemism, even though the 
latter differ in terms of their presentational design. Monolexemic X-phemisms differ 
from idiomatic ones in terms of conceptual only vs. conceptual and linguistic collocation. 
The distinction between collocation at the conceptual level only and at the lexical level 
can be illustrated through the difference between гъз глава затрива [gaz glava zatriva, 
“the ass kills the head”, eat someone out of house and home] and насоля v, tr./intr., perf., 
[nasolya “season with salt”, scold severely]. In the first instance the lexical item is in the 
form of a phrasal unit with explicit collocational preferences encoded, while the second 
is in the form of a single word and all semantic orchestration belongs to “backstage 
cognition” (Fauconnier [1997]). With the first the presentation design is more palpable 
and “graphically” presented spelling out a whole scenario, while the second one 
presents only a point of entry in a compounded ad hoc-concept. Both are fully 
lexicalized and should not display processing differences. However, details in 
representation matter, so that idiomatic X-phemisms are more likely to be associated 
with a uniform appraisal value across contexts, while monolexemic ones are more likely 
to freely fluctuate along the rhetoric dimension from euphemisms to dysphemisms in 
the euphemistic treadmill (Chamizo Domínguez 2005; Pinker 2008).  
 The fixed appraisal value is culturally tailored, even if the same metaphtonymic 
complexes underlie the X-phemistic expressions in two languages. The contrasts 
between гъз глава затрива and eat someone out of house and home illustrate the 
cultural specificity in exploiting the same set of conceptual metaphors. The two 
expressions differ in terms of their dysphemistic strength, i.e. the intensity of the 
negative associations. They also differ in degree of figurativity or idiomaticity. The 
English expression is mildly figurative, while the Bulgarian one is more conspicuously 
non-literal, which results from the differences in their presentational mode. Even if we 
assume that in both languages the motivating or source domain is that of FOOD/EATING, in 
English the mapping is significantly more direct, while in Bulgarian a complex 
metaphtonymic series is involved. Presentationally, eat is evaluatively neutral, and the 
domain is evoked by an orthophemistic expression, while гъз is strongly dysphemistic 
(considered in its bodily meaning a taboo) and only metaphtonymically associates with 
the FOOD (or to be more precise the consumption of it) domain. The dysphemistic rating 
of the two expressions is correspondingly different – the English one is mildly 
dysphemistic – the dysphemistic associations relate to the activated scenario of living on 
the streets, while in Bulgarian the expression is palpably dysphemistic as it utilizes a 
taboo lexical item – гъз. Recognizing a shared target conceptual content (“being 
gluttonous has dire consequences”) helps distinguish the role of dysphemistic creativity 
in the two languages.  
With conceptual metaphors exploited in X-phemisation it is either the nature of the 
source domain (in relation to the target denotatum) or the incongruity of the activated 
stereotypical frames from the source and target domains that creates the X-phemistic 




effect. Extremely important is the actual wording or the specific lexical concepts 
involved as each lexical concept provides differential access to the domain. The 
underlying conceptual metaphoric complex involves holistic mapping between the two 
domains but lexical concepts can tap different areas and highlight specific portions of 
the domains. Both to force-feed (as in “being force-fed information is a habit one can 
break” OED) and savour (as in “We savour at our leisure the delicate satire which we 
were too excited to appreciate duly” OED) rely on the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE 
FOOD, but only the first has heightened dysphemistic overtones. The lexical concepts 
chosen to probe into the metaphoric complex, with their specific perceptual associations 
and the nature of physicality implied in them, predispose towards opposingly marked X-
phemistic perceptions.   
What is more besides specific lexical concepts, certain domains when used as source 
domains in conceptual metaphor have higher proclivity for producing X-phemistic 
effects, while others will produce figurative encoding of a target domain, but will not 
readily yield X-phemisms. The FOOD domain and the SEEING domain are both used as 
source experiential matrices for conceptualizing “understanding / comprehension” and 
they have different proclivity to X-phemistic implications when used in this line of 
metaphoric conceptualization. The former has an intrinsic propensity to be exploited 
through metonymic shifts with marked dysphemistic effects as it is the processing of 
food that is experientially associated with potentially tabooed or displeasing human 
experiences. The detection of the respective conceptual metaphor is not sufficient for 
evoking a definite affective stance. The stretch from the experiential complex which is 
chosen for representation with its contiguous lexical concepts modifies the ad hoc 
blended conceptualization in a way which moulds the affective stance. The evocation of 
entrenched conceptual metaphors is not sufficient for engendering specific X-phemistic 
effects as becomes obvious from contrasting the utilization of the same underlying 
conceptual metaphor in two cultures. The nature of the literal meaning of eat s.o. out of 
house and home guarantees its evaluative innocence in comparison to its Bulgarian 
translation equivalent гъз глава затрива. In the English encoding a rather central and 
general lexical concept from the FOOD domain is utilized in the metaphoric transfer, 
while in Bulgarian a peripheral and marginal constituent of the frame is recruited which 
constitutes part of the “eating domain” only via conceptual metonymy. The presented 
part of the experiential complex in Bulgarian is associated with the end phase of 
processing food (digestion) and metonymically with the bodily organ involved in this 
phase of expelling unnecessary food from the body. The conceptual content (or if 
terminological stretching is made use of, the referent) of both expressions is roughly the 
same but their dysphemistic properties and their presentational modes (with the 
corresponding experiential complexes) differ resulting in different affectual values. In 
the comprehension process probably the whole domain will be accessed but the taste in 
the mouth (to analytically piggyback on the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE FOOD) is 
associated with the first anchor into the domain – the lexical items chosen chosen with 
their stereotypical lexical concepts and all their literal/non-literal ambiguities implied. 
The connotations associated with the literal meaning of the source domain used to refer 
to the target concept play a significant role in determining the specific X-phemistic 
charge of the resultant conceptualization based on the lexical concept from the source 
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domain. Ultimately socio-cognitive and cultural variables in the context will determine 
the actual X-phemistic effect of the particular utilization of a conceptual metaphor.  
  
 
5. Dysphemistic verbs  
 
The dependency of X-phemistic effects on the presentational mode chosen (i.e. the 
specific lexical concepts recruited from a source/vehicle domain) is observed not only in 
idiomatic X-phemisms derivable from established conceptual metaphors but also in 
dysphemistic verbs. Bolinger [1980: 80] believes that verbs are the least likely lexemes 
to have X-phemistic effects, “[o]f the three major classes of words, verbs seem least 
hospitable to bias. This is probably due to the transitory nature of what they name.” 
Recognizing the contextually specific, online ad hoc concept construction as the 
conceptual mechanisms behind X-phemisation frees the classes of words from ranking 
in terms of conceptual stability that could maintain the attachment of approval or 
disapproval. The recruited verbal lexeme may have inherent disapproval associations or 
such may be created in the blending of the frames. The act of choosing to “display” the 
intended meaning via the stereotyped frame of a given lexical item triggers an 
attentional switch and attitudinal revaluation. This process of reframing is guided by the 
“naturalist hypothesis”, which as defined by Allan and Burridge [1988: 7] and [1991: 22] 
has it that “the form of an expression somehow communicates the essential nature of 
whatever it denotes.” Form does not relate here to the expression plane (i.e. it is not 
sound symbolism that is implied). Form is intended to capture the uniqueness of the 
cognitive effects achieved by the use of a particular lexical item which carries with it an 
instruction for a particular conceptual access to a referent14. As will be illustrated below, 
verbs can be extremely powerful dysphemisms in relation to orthophemisms (be it of 
taboo activities or of neuter activities), because “[t]he key to understanding the nature 
of linguistic competence and its acquisition […] lies in the dialectical relationship 
between bodily dispositions and activities on the one hand, and sociocultural practices on 
the other” [Zlatev 1997: 1-2], (emphasis added).  
“Choosing” or “selecting” is not in itself a taboo concept, nor are most of the words we 
use to name such activities, but заплюя v., tr, perf., заплювам си v., tr, imperf., [zaplyuya, 
zaplyuvam si “spit on, mark something as one’s possession by spitting on it”, choose, pick 
out] present the activity of choosing as a nasty, even physically repulsive behavior. The 
strongly dysphemistic properties of the verbs arise from the bodily dispositions and 
activities and the sociocultural practices associated with the anchoring/profiling 
stereotypical frame of the domain associated with the actual lexical item used.  
Dysphemistic properties may arise out of the salient properties of the stereotypical 
concept (including the lexical one) associated with the intended (target) denotatum as is 
the case with the Bulgarian dysphemistic прецаквам v., tr, imperf., [pretsakvam, “cross-
trump”, spoil s.o.’s plans]. The lexical item belongs to the domain of playing cards. It 
relates to the possession and playing of trumps. The creativity of the dysphemism is at 
                                                
14 As one of Domínguez’s theses states [2005: 10] an X-phemism “cannot be replaced by any other word 
and still achieve the same cognitive effects.” 
 




sub-lexical, morphemic level. The intricate X-phemistic play results from 
“interlexicality” (Munat [2010]) and substitution of a prefix. In the context of playing 
cards the idea of playing a stronger trump than the one of one’s opponent is lexicalized 
in – надцаквам v., tr, imperf., [nadtsakvam, “overtrump”] and this is an attitudinally neutral 
or even positively marked lexical item. The playful substitution of the prefix results in an 
attitudinal switch which leads to the highly dysphemistic properties of прецакам, which 
is not used in the neutral context of playing cards due to the bidirectional interaction 
between source and target. The most cognitively effective (or at least most effort-
saving) interpretative strategy is to metaphtonymically associate spoiling s.o.’s plans 
with having more powerful trumps and thus prevent the opponent’s winning, i.e. the 
realization of someone’s plans. The negative attitudinal result stems form the 
stereotypical concept of “purposefully spoiling s.o.’s plans”.  
“Contamination” or the specific evaluative colouring of an X-phemism can arise from 
the topic denotatum, from the vehicle denotatum or from the blending of the 
contextually salient features of both (no matter if it is a figurative expression or a 
monolexemic substitute to the exclusion of phonetically-based innovations). As 
“expressions are not nasty by themselves” [Allan and Burridge 1988: 7], it is natural to 
conclude that dysphemistic effects can only stem from culturally informed 
conceptualizations of one of the denotata or the ad hoc concept, i.e. the dysphemistic 
effect is derived from choosing a particular framing perspective which achieves an 
attention switch that leads to modifications in salient features ordering. Put simply, X-
phemisms function as instructions for perception, i.e. they invite the listener to perceive 
the referent as construed in a particular frame within the interpretative practices of a 
given culture. Singer [1998: 5] defines culture as  
 
a pattern of learned, group-related perceptions – including both verbal and non-
verbal language, attitudes, values, belief systems, disbelief systems and behaviours 
that is accepted and expected by an identity group. [Emphasis added]. 
 
As one of Chamizo Domínguez’s theses on X-phemisms proclaims, X-phemisms have 
special cognitive and social effects which make them distinct from metaphor (with 
which they otherwise share a number of constitutive features) [Chamizo Domínguez 
2005: 13]. Central among the special effects of X-phemisms is their “aptness” of 
presentation function [Kress 2010: 55], in keeping with which the chosen linguistic 
resource is perceived as the most apt one to realize the intended meaning in the specific 
context. They acquire their attitudinal power by heavily exploiting the 
(re)presentational15 dimension of language.   
 Crespo Fernández [2008: 96] defines dysphemism as “the process whereby the most 
pejorative traits of the taboo are highlighted with an offensive aim to the addressee or to 
the concept itself.” This restricts the scope of dysphemisms only to cases in which the 
                                                
15 “[T]he representational implement of language ranks among the indirect means of representing, it is a 
medial implement in which certain intermediaries play a part as ordering factor ” [Bühler 2011: 171; 
emphasis in the original]. By the (re)presentational side of communication is understood the ability of 
lexical items to invite and evoke different ‘viewings’ of a referent. In the parlance of LCCM theory (Evans 
[2009]) the representational dimension relates to the possibility of one and the same cognitive model to 
be accessed by different lexical concepts with different properties and routes of access activated.  
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dysphemistic properties are derived from the traits of the target denotatum or when 
dysphemisation arises from conceptual interdiction. “Highlighting” is only possible if the 
properties are already present in the conceptualization of the denotatum. Often 
dysphemisms relate to innocuous or affect-neutral denotata and the process of 
dysphemisation is not one of “highlighting” the properties of the referent. Rather new 
properties are ascribed to the denotatum by its being accessed through a different 
lexical concept. The lexical concept used to name the vehicle (source) functions as a 
conceptualizing anchor (or beamer) which actively participates in the ad hoc 
conceptualization which is salience-driven and triggers property reordering in keeping 
with a new frame provided by the executed lexical concept. This is typically achieved by 
associating conceptually the topic referent with the stereotypical frame of another one 
(the vehicle), thus blending the stereotypical conceptualization of the topic (target) 
denotatum with the stereotypical conceptualization of the vehicle referent. 
Dysphemisation (i.e. downgrading or offending the referent/interactant) is not 
infrequent with orthophemistic, “innocent” or evaluatively uncoloured denotata. The 
verbal lexicon in Bulgarian in the semantic field of “working” is replete with 
dysphemistic expressions naming working. The denotata are neutral, hardly anyone (to 
the exclusion of sleuths) will hold negative associations with the human activity of 
working. The dysphemistic colloquial verbs used invite an obvious reframing of the 
activity of working (e.g. all the verbs below have the general meaning to overwork, to 
work one’s fingers to the bone: бича [bicha, “to saw trees”, work too much], бъхтя 
(се)[bahtya (se), “to push around, to beat”, work long hours, work strenuously]; блъскам 
(се) [blaskam (se), “to push against”, work hard, overwork]; счупвам се [schupvam se, 
“break”, work hard]; изгърбвам се [izgarbvam se, “bend over, stoop, get a hunchback”, 
work too much]; скъсвам се [skasvam se, “tear oneself”, work too much], скъсвам си 
гъза [skasvam si gaza, “tear one’s ass”, work too much], сбръчквам се, сбръчкам се 
[sbrachkvam se, “to wrinkle, to get wrinkled”, overwork], трепя се, претрепвам се 
[trepya se, pretrepvam se, “kill oneself, do away with oneself”, overwork]). When instead 
of using an orthophemistic expression a speaker resorts to one of these verbs, working 
is dysphemistically presented; framed as physical effort, adverse physical effects on the 
body or suffering to the point of death. The same dysphemistic effect is observed in the 
use of diminutives for the names of the professions. Instead of conveying dignity to a 
(menial) profession or job (as is one of the functions of euphemisms according to 
Domínguez [2005]), diminutives convey unsatisfactory or poor qualities of the person 
perfoming the job (see part 6). In such instances (creating dysphemisms for 
orthophemistic denotata), dysphemisation becomes a powerful appraisal resource in 
language, since the dysphemistic associations directly reveal the speaker’s evaluative 
stance as these are not inherent in the stereotypes for the respective denotata. 
Admittedly, certain experiential domains are predisposed towards providing reframing 
conceptualizations with the effect of verbal plummeting – “breaking”/“destruction”, 
“dirt”, etc. and these are the ones most frequently utilized in creating dysphemisms for 
orthophemistic referents. This understanding is fully in keeping with the definition 
provided by Allan and Burridge [1991] according to which a dysphemism is “an 
expression with connotations that are offensive either about the denotatum or to the 
audience, or both, and it is substituted for a neutral or euphemistic expression for just 
that reason” [Allan and Burridge 1991: 26]. So offensive connotations arise when a 




particular expression is used instead of a neutral or euphemistic expression naming the 
same denotatum – e.g. orthophemism работя много (rabotya mnogo, “work hard”) 
represented in discourse as стопяват ми се лагерите [stopyavat mi se lagerite, “my 
bearings/gudgeons melt”, work very hard]. The first expression is neutral and states the 
situation in which the speaker works too much with no indication as to the attitude of 
the speaker to this fact, via the second expression the concept of working hard and a lot 
is framed in а dysphemistic manner where the working person is construed as a 
machine which has been overused, i.e. as a fragile, easily breakable object. The 
dysphemistic effect is linked with conceptualizing working as an adverse, destructive 
force and not as an ordinary fact of life.  
Of course dysphemisms can be used to reinforce or intensify socially stigmatized 
concepts/referents, as is the case in the following dysphemism разкоствам v., tr, imperf., 
разкостя v., tr, perf., [razkostvam, razkostya “take the bones out of, debone”, to strip 
something of its basic parts, to dismantle or cannibalize]. The strongly dysphemistic verb 
encodes the vandalization of objects (predominantly used for stolen property: cars, TV 
sets, PCs, etc. sold in parts) by evoking the conceptual metaphor CHANGE IS LOSING. The 
literal meaning of the verb relates to the deboning of foods and is evaluatively neutral as 
common sense and cultural practices of cooking indicate that deboning is a necessary 
change/procedure for accomplishing a desirable goal (even though the procedure 
involves the manipulation of dead animal bodies). In its dysphemistc meaning, the verb 
reframes the dismantling of mechanical entities as depriving an object of its essential 
parts. The dysphemistc effects arise out of compounding the properties of a socio-
culturally desirable activity and of a socio-culturally abhorred activity. The lexicalized 
local metaphor PARTS ARE BONES frames the compounding of features and capitalizes on 
the inherent culturally motivated valuation of the referent for achieving the highly 
dysphemistic effect.  
 
 
6. Morphopragmatics and X-phemisation  
 
It turns out that size matters. Ruiz de Mendoza [1996] defines Spanish diminutives as 
attitudinal term operators that codify axiological relatedness between speaker and 
referent. In a like manner, Bulgarian diminutives constitute a flexible resource for the 
whole attitudinal range: expressing affect, judgment and appreciation, inseparably 
intertwined in a single suffixal blend. These functions render diminutives in Bulgarian 
agents of intricate X-phemistic functions without relying on figurativity in reframing. 
Yet, they do involve elaborate patterns of reframing. The linguistic process of 
diminution is a central appraisal resource utilizing reframing and heavily relying on 
metonymic projections. Diminutive suffixes in Bulgarian function as reframing prompts 
in which the rich association complex attached to them has to be contextually gauged in 
understanding the specific socio-cognitive motivation in using a diminutive word. After 
all, as Wierzbicka [1992: 150] claims, “[w]ords are a society’s most basic cultural 
artifacts, and they provide the best key to a culture’s values and assumptions - on 
condition that they are properly understood.”   
Bulgarian is among the languages with richly developed system of both denotative 
and connotative diminutives. Even though denotative diminutives also have an 
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evaluative bias, it is connotative diminutives that are mostly deployed as powerful X-
phemisms. Within the Bulgarian linguistic tradition Zidarova [2005, 2008] claims that 
nominal diminution in Bulgarian is generally associated with predominantly denotative 
semantic contribution on the part of diminutive affixes, while in the derivative 
diminutives from bases that belong to other lexical classes the emotive-evaluative 
predominates due to the specific nature of their denotative character [Zidarova 2008: 
1]. The distinction between denotative and cannotative diminutives can be summarized 
in the opposition between using diminutives to designate one of the core denotative 
components of dimunition – “smallness”, whereas connotative ones are used with a 
variety of semantic effects. The diminutive suffix -че (che) in itself is usually exploited 
for denotative diminution associated with actual smallness of denotata or with and is 
usually associated with positive connotations: краче n., n., sg., [krache, “leg-DIM”], столче 
n., n., sg., [stolche, “chair-DIM”], палче n., n., sg., [palche, “thumb-DIM”], etc. Connotative 
diminutives on the other hand do not depend on the denotative feature “smallness”. 
Their predominant function is the projection of an evaluative stance. X-phemisation 
within diminution can be detected only when there is a switch in markedness, i.e. when 
the social sensitivities of interactants predispose them towards the use of diminutives 
likely to evoke or express positive attitudes to something that need not be positively 
marked in the emotional brain (Тя е истинска кукличка. [Tya e istinska kuklichka. She 
is a real doll-DIM]) or the reverse, a denotatum not necessarily negatively marked is 
framed or named by linguistic resources evoking or expressing negative attitudes – e.g. 
един животец n., m., sg., [edin zhivotes, “one life-DIM”]. While Тя е истинска кукличка is 
X-phemistically ambiguous, i.e. it might be used euphemistically or dysphemistically, the 
noun phrase един животец is dysphemistic as it designates a way of life devoid of the 
basic features of living, not worthy of the fully-fledged lexical concept life. Even if we 
assume that the denotative (literal) feature “small” is activated as a default component 
of the diminutive noun, “lack of” or “insufficiency” are by implication also evoked. 
Nominal diminutives from positive abstract bases e.g. щастийце n., n., sg., [shtastiytse, 
“happiness-DIM”] tend to be dysphemistic as they imply reduction in the positive 
features associated with the concept (even in cases when the base does not name a 
potentially gradable concept). Such dysphemisms express negative attitudes and more 
importantly ascribe negative features to the denotatum. Щастийце implies that the 
feeling of happiness is so miserable that it cannot be named with the neutral, non-
diminutive lexeme щастие, or by ironic implication it is used to name an actual 
experience of unhappiness. Животец is restricted to the first dysphemistic 
interpretation only, in which the way of living is of such low quality that it can’t possibly 
be worthy of being named by the non-diminutive lexeme. In кукличка n., f., sg., [kuklichka, 
“doll-DIM”] the referential metaphor (“doll” used to describe the behavior of a human), 
operationally modified by a diminutive, can be read euphemistically to indicate 
endearment and attachement in cases in which the speaker describes a little girl but it 
would be ironically dysphemistic in cases in which the diminutive is used in a context in 
which the referent cannot genuinely be associated with the denotative feature “small”.   
When used with nouns denoting professional occupations diminutives also strongly 
deviate from the positive evaluative stance supposedly16 associated with them and 
                                                
16 Reference is made here to the proverbial positive evaluation associated with diminutives, captured in 




result in dysphemisms. A possible explanation for the dysphemistic function of 
diminutives with professions stems from the impossibility to associate “smallness” as a 
default feature with the denotatum. The names of professions themselves can have 
positive or negative connotations stemming from the nature of the denoted profession, 
but attitudes associated with the denotatum are not necessarily directly reflected in the 
linguistic resources (orthophemisms). When using diminutives with names of 
professions the semantic effect is the predication of inadequate or insufficient 
professional qualities of the specific referent. When describing someone as докторче n., 
n., sg., [doktorche, “doctor-DIM”], писателче n., n., sg., [pisatelche, “writer-DIM”], 
журналистче n., n., sg., [zhurnalistche, “journalist-DIM”], даскалче n., n., sg., [daskalche, 
“teacher-DIM”], професорче n., n., sg., [profesorche, “professor-DIM”], etc. a speaker does 
not mean that someone of young age is practicing the profession. Rather the 
dysphemistic meaning is to express disregard, low esteem or a slighting attitude to the 
practitioner of the profession. This interpretation is harmonious with Dressler and 
Merlini Barbaresi’s [1994: 144ff.] formulation of the basic morphopragmatic meaning of 
diminutives:  
 
The general morphopragmatic meaning of diminutives is the feature [non-serious], 
which relates to the morphosemantic feature [non- important], which is related via 
metaphor to the morphosemantic denotation [small]. 
   
In the lexis of professions in Bulgarian, diminutives preserve the feature [non-
important] but it is exploited for the expression of lack of or low level of professionalism 
on the part of the referent, not the prototypical positive emotive-evaluative associations 
“playfulness, meiosis, love, sympathy and empathy”, which Dressler and Merlini 
Barbaresi [ibid.] associate with diminutives via metaphoric extension from the central 
denotative features thereof. Profession diminutives are used to express the speaker’s 
negative attitude to the professional conduct or achievements of the referent by direct 
application of the feature [non-serious] to the referent. It bears the implication that the 
referent is either incapable to practice their profession at the required standards or the 
performance is exceptionally poor. 
Adjectival diminutives derived in the area of subjective valuations of taste from 
negative bases have marked euphemistic effects especially in answering а host’s 
questions concerning the food served: киселичък adj, n., sg., [kiselichak, “sour-DIM”], 
горчивичък adj, n., sg., [gorchivichak, “bitter-DIM”], соленичък adj, n., sg., [solenichak, “salty-
DIM”]. The guest is experiencing discomfort but politeness requirements invite them to 
approach the issue in a delicate manner by belittling the unpleasantness of the 
experience.    
In non-committal expression of opinion or appreciation of objects diminutives 
function as indicators of lack of specific interest. These are derived from positive lexical 
bases – интересничък adj, n., sg., [interesnichak, “interesting-DIM”], хубавичък adj, n., sg., 
[hubavichak “pretty-DIM”], приятничък adj, n., sg., [priyatnichak, “pleasant-DIM’”]. The 
                                                                                                                                                    
Wierzbicka’s contention that “The central place of warmth, of affection, in Slavic as well as in 
Mediterranean cultures, is reflected, among other things, in the rich system of expressive derivation, and 
in particular in the highly developed system of diminutives.” [Wierzbicka 1991: 50]  
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communicative function of such diminutives is not to indicate objective lowering of the 
property possessed by an entity, but to indicate disinterested attitude on the part of the 
speaker. Typically they are used in confirming an evaluation offered by the interlocutor. 
The adjectives which tolerate diminution of this type are neutral or occupy the pivotal 
region as defined by Cruse [1986: 205] or ones which name the possession of the 
property to a neutral degree. Adjectives expressing a point of satiation of the property in 
either the negative or positive poles do not permit diminution. *завладяващичък adj, n., 
sg., [zavladyavashtichak, “captivating-DIM”]; *опияняващичък adj, n., sg., 
[opiyanyavashichak, metaphoric extension of intoxicating meaning “extremely pleasant 
and intriguing-DIM”]. 
 Positive adjectives with diminutive affixes usually function as boosters – they 
reinforce the positive features of the denotatum via the connotations of positive 
evaluation traditionally associated with diminutive affixes. This results from the 
prototypical concept ‘small/child’ which many among whom Wierzbicka (1984) and 
Jurafsky (1996) recognize as central for diminutive affixes. However, in a carnivalesque 
manner such positive adjectives can acquire ironic negative marking and become 
dysphemistic, when the speaker purposefully avoids acknowledging their negative 
attitude to the denotatum. By utilizing diminution the speaker inadvertently achieves 
the effect of subtle awareness in the interactants of a strong negative attitude which 
might be perceived as insulting or merely humorously deprecating. Хубавичък adj, n., sg., 
[hubavichak, “pretty-DIM”] – can mean extremely nice or ugly. Such dysphemistic 
euphemistic diminutives (which they may become only when not used in 
communication with children) friends usually imply dismissive deprecation or ironically 
feigned ‘approval’. As has become obvious, dimunition in Bulgarian has a reserved place 
in the appraisal system executed via X-phemisation. We are far away from having 
understood the inticacies of X-phemistic dimunition in terms of its complex rhetoric. As 
Kryk-Kastovsky [2000: 173] aptly summarizes, 
 
[D]iminution is a much more complex and multifarious process than has been 
believed so far. Languages whose word formation rules allow an almost unlimited 
derivation of diminutives are characterised by a high degree of semantic and 
pragmatic complexity.  
 
Amidst this complexity Sáenz [1999] elaborates two central metonymic transfers 
which associate emotional attitudes with conceptualizations of the denotata of 
diminutives and indicate their rhetoric potential for encoding contradictory stance 
positions: a) smallness via its conceptually contiguous manageability when ascribed to 
entities renders them more likeable; b) the possibility to ignore small entities due to 
their perceived innocuousness renders them unpleasant. Along this cline between 
adorable and repulsive, dimunition challenges the creativity of humans as rhetors by 
offering ample resources for carefully grading attitudinal stances in every instance of 









7. Concluding remarks 
 
X-phemisms function as communication adaptation strategies which stem from the 
conscious discursive positioning of the speaker in relation to interactants and entities 
spoken about. They are not simply cross-varietal synonyms – they always add the 
dimension of affect and thus constitute neo-semanticisms, not simply synonyms with 
differential sociological or stylistic effect – they encode the affect dimension and it 
becomes part of their multidimensional semantic constitution in the process of 
subsequent lexicalization. They usually involve low transparency as they display 
morphotactic or morphosemantic complexity and thus require active involvement on 
the part of both interactants. Most are figurative in the sense defined by Kövecses17 
[2008: 380] – they are not direct names, but are rather derived metaphtonymically. As 
an active, dynamic, contextually modeled multidimensional process X-phemisation can 
be approached from a variety of perspectives, not all of which would be readily 
identified as strictly linguistic. In the present paper the focus within the multifaceted X-
phemisation process was on the involved re-conceptualization of the denotata with an 
implied evaluative recalibration which renders the overall result X-phemistic no matter 
if X-phemisation results from purposeful communicative behavior or is an inadvertent 
and accompanying side-effect of a linguistic/social gaffe.  
Three types of language independent factors play significant roles in motivating and 
guiding creativity in X-phemisation processes – ecological, experiential and cognitive 
motivation. It is difficult to draw an analytically significant distinction between 
experiential and cognitive motivation in X-phemisation as the two are closely related, so 
cognitive was used as a blanket term, with no detailed discrimination being specified 
between cognitive and experiential motivation for X-phemisms. The ecological 
motivation behind X-phemisms is captured in their unique socio-cultural functions 
within the appraisal system of languages and their stance-taking properties. Being 
inferentially overpotent, X-phemisms invite a complex process of alignment, which 
involves creativity both on the side of the speaker and on the side of the hearer. From 
the point of view of the speaker, the choice of the expression provides “predictive 
control”, as elaborated by Schneider [2004: 64]: 
 
[w]e group things into categories because we expect that the things within a given 
category will be similar in some ways and different in others from things alien to the 
category. This gives us predictive control over the environment, a leg up in deciding 
on appropriate behavior. 
 
For the hearer, this is an invitation to go beyond the stereotypical framing of the 
denotatum and engage in situationally tailored reframing. In this respect, as 
indisputable appraisal effect agents X-phemisms provide a rich area for further research 
in the complexity of appraisal as permeating the lexical units, not only the systems of the 
lexicogrammar.  
                                                
17 In describing the nature of emotional language Kövecses [2008: 380] defines it as “highly figurative; 
that is, it is dominated by metaphorical and metonymic expressions.” For him figurativity is measured by 
the degree of metaphtonymisation. 
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X-phemisation is in its greater part recruited for the encoding of implicit attitude, i.e. 
utterances in which attitudinal assessment cannot be directly and overtly questioned 
and this is what makes X-phemisms such powerful appraisal resources. X-phemisms are 
vents for the conceptual creativity and the socio-emotive sensitivities of humans. The 
significance of findings associated with their study far outweighs the complexities in 
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